12 posts tagged “morality”

So, I've been thinking about truth a lot lately. Namely, I've been wondering how important truth really is in our lives. Does truth really matter that much? Most of us make a big deal out of it, but is it really that big of a deal? Does it define us? Does it determine our lives?

In other words, does truth determine our character, our virtue, who we are? I've been thinking about this because I wonder how many of us judge people based on what they think is true and a particular situation I'm in.

I've been hanging out with this girl for a couple of months. We finally had the "relationship" talk, and she essentially told me that my nonbeliever status may be problematic for her (She's a devout Christian). So, we are still hanging out but there's no relationship there. I hope I'm not setting myself up to get crushed....It's kinda feels like it because she hasn't told me that my nonbeliever status won't be a problem...

Anyway, I told her that I understand her concern but disagree with it. After she left, I was pretty bummed about it. She can't potential have a relationship with me because I'm a nonbeliever....Why does what I believe to be untrue or true matter at all? Shouldn't my character, virtue, my life goals, who I am, etc, matter more than what I find to be true? I think so.

It makes me wonder if truth is separate from what really matters about us. At the end of the day, I don't think it determines who we are and how we act. For some reason, I think other things do that. For example, you can't really discuss the truth of character, virtue, or your existence. These things just are; they aren't a function of truth. I haven't decided what they are a function of, though.

When I look at a person, I see a person. I don't see a Christian, Muslim, or atheist. These labels deal with truth propositions, not the person's character or virtue. I am not defined by my truth. I am defined by who I am. At least that's what I currently think. 

So I finished Robert Solomon's Living with Nietzsche a few weeks ago. I haven't digested the book completely because there is just so much to dig into and remember. However, over the past day or so, I've been going over certain passages that I've outlined. I’ve been trying to find the main difference between Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Nietzsche virtue ethics in an attempt to understand what makes Nietzsche's take on virtue ethics unique.

Aristotle is essentially the face of virtue ethics; when one wants to understand virtue ethics, one goes straight to Aristotle. This is mainly because Aristotle actually gives us an extensive list of virtues, whereas Nietzsche does not, not to mention, Nietzsche and his philosophical hammer have a bad reputation. Most people think of Nietzsche as this philosopher that destroys people’s beliefs and as an immoralist that taints the youth’s minds. But it’s important to note that Nietzsche called himself an “immoralist” only because he rejected the morality of his day, namely absolute Christian morality and Kant’s abstract principles, not because he advocated unethical behavior.

Aristotle defines a virtue as the "means between the extremes." To this day, this criterion is used as the basis of our virtuous behavior. We all pretty much agree that between two extremes, the middle is the best place to be. Take my post on pride, for example. I think pride and humility must have a balance. In other words, the best place between the two is the middle. Nietzsche took a different take on things. At the heart of all of his virtues is this since of overflowing or abundance. So, I think the main difference between the virtue ethics of Aristotle and Nietzsche is that Aristotle is focused on having the right amount of something (the virtue), whereas Nietzsche wants no limits. The right amount is an overabundance of the virtue. To illustrate this difference, let’s take the virtue we call courage.

Both Aristotle and Nietzsche consider courage to be their main virtue, but their concepts and applications of the virtue are extremely different. Aristotle sees courage as a function of fear, having just the right amount of fear. Thus, courage resides between recklessness (not having any fear) and cowardice (having too much fear). This is the type of courage that would do one good in the battlefield. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is more concerned with a concept of courage that can be applied to, as Solomon says, “one’s convictions or one’s willingness to go on in the face of pain and illness.”

This is how Solomon describes Nietzsche concept of courage:

For Nietzsche, it seems that having courage means not so much overcoming fear (the standard account) or even having “just the right amount” of fear (the overly quantitative Aristotelian account.) Rather, as in so many of his conceptions of virtue, Nietzsche’s model (or metaphor) is “overflowing.” In the case of courage, I would suggest, it is overflowing with a sense of mission, even duty (but emphatically not in the Kantian sense.) It is a sense of something-to-be-done no matter what (within the bounds of the appropriate context), in the face of obstacles to be overcome, no matter what (within bounds).

Nietzsche’s courage isn’t a function of fear. It’s a function of one’s abundance of determination to complete a grueling task or to say “Yes!” to life, despite all the pain and suffering and the reality of the Absurd. It’s a type of existential courage, one that can be applied directly to your life and not just the battlefield. So, in the end, courage isn’t about having the right amount of fear. It’s about having determination that overwhelms fear. As Solomon puts it, “courage, in other words, is not overcoming fear. It is an overflowing of determination, constituted by an overwhelming and yet skillfully directed cascading of emotion.”

Personally, I find Nietzsche’s take on virtue ethics to be refreshing. Virtuous behavior should be about overflowing action based on one's enthusiasm and style, not some type of restraint. In particular, Nietzsche's concept of courage is more positive, more the way I think courage should be. More on Nietzsche’s virtues later.  

 “It is the weak nature of man that urns for explanations outside of the self. They create foolish, yet ingenious, concepts to explain good and evil, justice and injustice, love and hate. But, why? Why do they do this? Because man does not wish to be held responsible. Responsibility implies accountability, not to some supernatural concept, but to humanity itself; for it is far worse to answer to humanity than to answer to man’s worst creation—one is realized within finite time, the other is not. Consequentially, it is worse to understand that yourself is the foundation for evil, that you are to blame for the negative implications of your choices and actions on yourself and others, that you are the source of greed, hate, injustice, prejudice, cruelty, racism, addiction, animosity, corruption, insensitivity, hostility, murder, and poverty, among other things. And not because of some original sin, but because of humans’ inability to control emotions and their proceeding actions and consequences, because of man's selfishness. Does this mean that man is innately evil? Not at all. Does this mean that man is innately good? Not at all. Man is simply man: neither purely evil nor purely good, but capable of doing the most gruesome, inhuman acts, possible, as well as the most precious, selfless acts imaginable, and everything in between. To realize this is to realize that the problem of evil is not a problem; for humans are the foundation for and create evil. Thus, the problem is not evil, but the concept. If one lets go of the concept, one sees the truth: Humanity is the foundation of everything—wisdom, knowledge, injustice, good, evil, and, most importantly, love.”

I like to think that I have grown a lot over the past year or so: never have I read or thought as much as I have this past year or so. At this stage in my life, I am just beginning to embark on the continuous process of developing my personal philosophy, my perspective, the way in which I view the human condition and existence. Nevertheless, I think it is important to assess what philosophy I have developed thus far, even if it is only in its beginning stage.

Perhaps the most existential choice that I have made in my life thus far is the choice to not believe in a supreme being, the traditional monotheistic God. While this choice has been extremely important to me, I feel like what I hold to be valuable or existential is not a function of whether one agrees with this choice. I personally believe that believers and nonbelievers are living in the "here and now" trying to get the best out of the one life we all have. Some of us decide we need God, while others decide otherwise. Some of us find traditional religion to be a tragic lie, while others do not. There are always different means to the same end.

In line with existentialism, the concept of Nothingness is important to my philosophy. I believe that there is no intrinsic meaning to the universe, no innate, preset meaning to anything. In some sense, everything means nothing--originally. Existence precedes essence in that we existence and then we create meaning. In other words, meaning in one's life is not here to be discovered (essence precedes existence). Meaning in one's life must be created.

Truth is a matter of perspective, just like anything else. It is nonsensical to claim that one knows the way to live or the truth. While the natural tendency is to do so, we must overcome this dogmatic, insecure part of the self. Such a mindset breeds division (no matter how much you claim to cover it up with so-called "love". This type of "love" isn't true love), stupidity and dogma. While it is obvious that some truths are better than others, it should also be obvious that within each of our perspectives is some sort of seed of truth. We simply need to look for it through the barriers of language.

Objective morality is dead. Its death should be more apparent now, as we start to think of ourselves as global citizens rather than citizens of a specific country. In other words, morality that says "This is right and this is wrong" is foolish; we must move beyond such a false dichotomy. Build a system of virtues and act in accordance with it. Actions based on virtues exhibit who you really are, not actions based on a nonsensical concept of morality. Plus, look what morality has produced--immoral beings. That is, morality hasn't, and doesn't, work.  

Well, I definitely could write more. I probably will later. It's time to keep back to the family. Until then, I bid you all a good evening!  

The Gay Science has been better than I expected: not only are there copious philosophical gems, but also one begins to gain a better understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy because he introduces all the primary aspects of his philosophy--his morality, his arguments against Christianity and pity, his psychoanalysis, among other things.

Nietzsche is known as an "immoralist", but he most definitely was not, at least not in the general  sense of the term. He was an immoralist because he rejected morality with a capital "M." Anyways, I had to go apply for another social security card early this morning (It really sucked!). Knowing that I had to wait, I brought The Gay Science to read while in line.

This morning I found the following, thereby discovering the ethical maxim fundamental to Nietzsche's morality:

How is it at all possible to keep to one's own way? Constantly, some clamor or other calls us aside; rarely does our eye behold anything that does not require us to drop our own preoccupation instantly to help. I know, there are a hundred decent and praiseworthy ways of losing my own way, and they are truly highly "moral"! Indeed, those who now preach the morality of pity even take the view that precisely this and only this moral--to lose one's own way in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor. I know just as certainly that I only need to expose myself to the sight of some genuine distress and I am lost. And if a suffering friend said to me, "Look, I am about to die; please promise me to die with me,I should promise it; and the sight of a small mountain tribe fighting for its liberty would persuade me to offer it my hand and my life--if for goods reasons I may choose for once two bad examples. All such arousing of pity and calling for help is secretly seductive, for our "own way" is too hard and demanding and to remote from the love and gratitude of others, and we do not really mind escaping from it--and from our very own conscience--to flee into the conscience of the others and into the lovely temple of the "religion of pity."

As soon as any war breaks out anywhere, there also breaks out precisely among the noblest people a pleasure that, to be sure, is kept secret: Rapturously, they throw themselves into the new danger of death because the sacrifice for the fatherland seems to them to offer the long desired permission--to dodge their goal; war offers them a detour to suicide, but a detour with a good conscience. And while I shall keep silent about some points, I do not want to remain silent about my morality which says to me: Live in seclusion so that you can live for yourself. Live in ignorance about what seems most important to your age. Between yourself and today lay the skin of at least three centuries. And the clamor of today, the noise of wars and revolutions should be a mere murmur for you. You will also wish to help--but only those whose distress you understand entirely because they share with you one suffering and one hope--your friends--and only in the manner in which you help yourself. I want to make them bolder, more persevering, simply, gayer. I want to teach them what is understood by so few today, least of all by these preachers of pity: to share not suffering but joy. (I added the bold.)

What is fundamental to his ethic is the fact that one cannot fully understand another's suffering: 'Our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbor, even if we eat from one pot." The reason pity is horrible is because, at its very essence, "it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is distinctively personal." Those who pity forget "the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell." Ultimately, people pity others for a couple of reasons: (1) They despite all suffering, most importantly their own, (2) they which to be comfortable, and (3) their "own way" is "too hard and demanding and too remote from the love and gratitude of others."

I find Nietzsche's analysis of pity to be quite interesting, but I find some of his assumptions to be troubling. For one, it seems that he implies that everyone's goal is to commit suicide: "the sacrifice for the fatherland seems to them to offer the long desired permission--to dodge their goal; war offers them a detour to suicide, but a detour with a good conscience." I don't know how accurate this assumption is; personally, the people I have met don't seem to make it a goal to kill themselves. However, perhaps he is criticizing the belief in an afterlife because the belief in an afterlife implies a hatred for this life, though to what extent I'm not sure. The belief in an afterlife arise from one's want to commit suicide? I'm not sure.

Secondly, I don't think people lose their way in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor. To say such a thing is to imply that helping others is not a part of one's "way", which, one could argue, is probably an integral, and perhaps rational (as if that matters), part of one's "way." Part of me wonders to what extent Nietzsche's utterly depressing lonliness has influenced this part of his ethics.

Perhaps what rubs me the wrong way the most, is his moral maxim to "live in seclusion so that you can live for yourself." But you can live for yourself and help others at the same time. Seclusion is not necessary for one to live his or her "own way." And, quite frankily, what value is your way if you are only progressing yourself? Where is the honor in such a "way"? 

Despite my brief and rudimentary critique, I agree with Nietzsche that we should help those who's suffering we understand, but only in a manner in which one helps one's self. (When I read this part, Ayn Rand's Objectivism came to mind.) However, I would argue that in most cases, helping another almost always helps yourself whether it be for selfish reasons or not, though this implies that one has a willingness to understand another's suffering.

After thinking about the fundamental ethical maxim in Nietzsche's philosophy, I don't think my ambiguity towards some of the implications of his analysis and assumptions effect its validity. The point of one's morality should be "to share not suffering but joy," because joy should be spread--not suffering. Insofar as pity prevents this, it should be done away with. This I think, is what Nietzsche is really trying to get across.  

Here are the primary excerpts in which she lays out objectivist ethics:

"The standard of value of the Objectivist ethics--the standard by which one judges what is good or evil--is man's life, or; that which is require for man's survival qua man. Since reason is man's basic means of survival, that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil." (Man's survival qua man: the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan--in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice.)

"The three cardinal values of the Objectivist ethics--the three values which, together, are the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life--are: Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem, with their three corresponding virtues: Rationality, Productiveness, Pride.
 
"The basic social principle of the Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end in itself, so every living human being is an end in himself, not the means to the ends or the welfare of others--and, therefore, that man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. To live for his own sake means that the achievement of his own happiness is man's highest moral purpose. " (Bold added).

"The Objectivist ethics proudly advocates and upholds rational selfishness--which means: the values required for man's survival qua man--which means: the values required for human survival--not the values produced by the desires, the emotions, the "aspirations," the feelings, the whims or the needs of irrational brutes, who have never outgrown the primordial practice of human sacrifices, have never discovered an industrial society and can conceive of no self-interest but that of grabbing the loot of the moment.

"The Objectivist ethics holds that human good does not require human sacrifices and cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of anyone to anyone. It holds that the rational interests of men do not clash--that there is no conflict of interest among men who do not desire the unearned, who do not make sacrifices nor accept them, who deal with one another as traders, giving value for value." 

And she isn't a fan of altruism at all:

These three schools differ only in their method of approach, not in their content. In content, they are merely variants of altruism, the ethical theory which regards man as a sacrificial animal, which holds that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest and moral duty, virtue and value. The differences occur only over the question of who is to be sacrificed to whom. Altruism holds death as its ultimate goal and standard of values--and it is logical that renunciation, resignation, self-denial, and every other form of suffering, including self-destruction, are the virtues it advocates. And logically, these are the only things that the practitioners of altruism have achieved and are achieving now.

What do you think? I find her views on altruism to be hyperbole. Altruism does not take one's right to exist away from him or her, nor does it hold death as its ultimate goal and standard of values. Perhaps self-sacrifice is the highest moral duty in altruism. But is this necessarily a bad thing? It can be, but doesn't have to be.

And, is self-sacrifice really irrational? Is self-sacrifice only rational when it is in the best interest of the sacrificing parties' life and happiness, when something of value is being "traded"--my happiness for your happiness?
 

The majority of people, at least religious people, believe that morality comes from religion. I have argued hat this is not the case numerous times, but I was thinking: Even if people actually believe morality comes from religion, how is such a belief even possible? How can morality possibly come from religion? Well, I was thinking, and I don't see how the religious can rationally believe this (and, yes, the religious can be rational within the system of religion).

Traditionally, morality derived from religion is considered to be absolute, unchanging, black and white. First of all, it is quite clear that religious morals change as societies are influenced by thought and culture. Secondly, how can we use religion as a basis for absolute morality when Christians themselves, or any religious peoples for that matter, cannot even decide what is moral and what is immoral.

Is homosexuality morally permissible in the eyes of God? Well, queer theology thinks so. But, what about those God-hates-fags-believing people? Uh, well, homosexuality is completely immoral. You see, both groups call themselves Christians and subscribe to the same holy book, but neither one can agree on what is moral and what is immoral, when probably the majority within each group claims that morality is absolute.

Thirdly, how is religious morality black and white? It isn't. Religious morality usually comes in the form of rules: this is moral, this is not. How can we form moral rules for subjective experiences? What if, at the time of the experience, what the rule deems to be immoral is actually quite moral. Or what if, given the individual's subjectivity, the rule seems to be morally contradictory. Perhaps I was Hitler's child. Should I honor my father? Probably not. Or what if I was homeless and needed something to eat? Are you honestly telling me I couldn't steal something to eat? What if I was too kill someone in self-defense? What if I needed to kill someone in order to prevent the harm that could possibly be imposed on others? Possibly moral rules can be used as guidelines, but rules are meant to be broken, especially moral rules.

I don't see morality as a system of rules working all that well. I prefer a system of virtues.   

Traditional Judeo-Christian morality tells us to love our neighbors. Most of us, whether religous or not, would agree with this moral sentiment. But, if we are to love everyone, then is this really "love"? There is a sense in which "love" loses the power it is suppose to contain.

So, are we really suppose to love everyone? Is that even possible? Should we really "love" strangers and our enemies? Is it moral to "love" so inclusively? Wow....that just sounded whorish. Whorish morality anyone?

"If God does not exist, everything is allowed." Dostoevsky's character, Ivan Karamazov, said this while discussing theology around the dinner table in his father's house. Not surprisingly, Ivan is an atheist. Only an atheist would say this, right? Atheists aren't moral. They can't be moral! God is the foundation for all morality. If one does not believe in God, then how can one moral? How can one believe in morality? What is the incentive to be moral? (Does there even have to be an incentive to be moral?)

Nietzsche infamously claimed the death of God over a century ago; he new his words were cataclysmic, and rightly so. God seems to be the foundation of almost everything. Get rid of God and you get utter chaos. So when Nietzsche claimed the death of God, the very foundation in which morality was based upon crumbled. But God is dead and morality is still practiced widely. Perhaps Nietzsche was wrong? I don't think so. Maybe we can replace "God" with things more powerful: our thoughts, rationale, and love. Most importantly, maybe God isn't the foundation for morality. Perhaps we are.

Nevertheless, some people still maintain that one can only be moral if one is religious. How naive and idiotic of such people to think this. I fully agree with what Andre Comte-Sponville has to say on this topic.

As Kant demonstrated, either morals are autonomous or they do not exist at all. If a person refrains from murdering his neighbor only out of fear of divine retribution, his behavior is dictated not by moral values but by caution, fear of the holy policeman, egoism. And if a person does good only with an eye to salvation, she is not doing good (since her behavior is dictated by self-interest, rather than by duty or by love) and will thus not be saved. This is Kant, the Enlightenment and humanity at their best: A good deed is not good because God commanded me to do it (in which case it would have been good for Abraham to slit his son's throat); on the contrary, it is because an action is good that it is possible to believe God commanded it. Rather than religion being the basis for morals, morals are now the basis for religion. This is the inception of modernity. To have a religion, the Critique of Practical Reason points out, is to "acknowledge all one's duties as sacred commandments." For those who no longer have faith, commandments vanish (or, rather, lose their sacred quality), and all that remains are duties--that is, the commandments we impose upon ourselves.

Alain puts it beautifully in his Letters to Sergio Solmi on the Philosophy of Kant: "Ethics means knowing that we are spirit and thus have certain obligations, for noblesse oblige. Ethics is neither more nor less than a sense of dignity." Should I rob, rape and murder? It would be unworthy of me--unworthy of what humanity has become, unworthy of the education I have been given, unworthy of what I am and wish to be. I therefore refrain from such behavior, and this is what is know as ethics. There is no need to believe in God--one need believe only in one's parents and mentors, one's friends (provided they are well chose) and one's conscience.

As Comte-Sponville, puts it, "'If God does not exist,' says Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov, 'everything is allowed.' Not at all, for the simple reason that I will not allow myself everything!"